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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals was established pursuant to U.C.A. 78-2-2(4) 
and U.C.A. 78-2a-3(j) which allows the Utah Supreme Court to transfer to the Court of 
Appeals any of the matters over which the Utah Supreme Court has original appellate 
jurisdiction. 
Initially this case was filed in the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to U.C.A. 78-2-
2(3)(j), a case over which the Court of Appeals did not have original appellate 
jurisdiction. 
The Utah Supreme Court transferred this case to the Court of Appeals on January 
15, 1999. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES & STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue No. 1: The Circuit Court (now District Court) lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction over the case and personal jurisdiction over the person appellant in light of 
the facts (i) appellant was never served; and (ii) the previous involuntary dismissal by the 
District Court pursuant to Rule 41(b) which constituted an "adjudication upon the merits, 
thus rendering plaintiffs complaint incapable of being either amended or continued." 
Steinerv. State. 495 P.2d 809 (Utah 1972) 
Nichols v. State. 554 P.2d 231 (Utah 1976) 
Southern Title Guaranty Co. v. Bethers. 761 P.2d 951 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) 
State of Utah. Dept. of Social Services v. Vigil. 784 P.2d 1130, 1132 (Utah 1989) 
Rule 12(h)(2) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Standard of Review: Clearly Erroneous 
Issue No. 2: Appellee's claims are absolutely barred by the doctrine of res judicata. 
Steiner, Nichols, supras. 
Standard of Review: Clearly Erroneous 
Issue No. 3: Appellee's claims are absolutely barred by the statute of limitations; 




Rule 4-103(30 Utah Rules of Judicial Administration 
Rule 60(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
U.C.A. §78-12-40 
Burgers v. Maiben. 652 P.2d 1320 (Utah 1982) 
Robertson v. Wegmann. 436 U.S. 584, 56 L.Ed.2d 554, 98 S. Ct. 1991 
Monroe v. Pape. 365 U.S. 167, 5 L.Ed.2d 492, 81 S. Ct. 473 
United States v. Kubrick. 444 U.S. I l l , 117, 100 S. Ct. 352, 356-57, 
62 L.Ed 2d 259 (1979) 
Standard of Review: Clearly Erroneous 
Issue No. 4: Appellee's claims are further barred by the doctrine of waiver, laches, 
and estoppel. 
Mackall v. Caskear. 137 U.S. 556,11 S. Ct. 178, 34 L.Ed. 776 
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Alsop v. Riker. 155 U.S. 449, 15 S. Ct. 162, 39 L.Ed. 218 
Hagerman v. Bates. S.Cal.App. 391, 38 P. 1100 
Townsend v. Vanderwerker. 160 U.S. 38, 19 S.Ct. 352, 43 L.Ed. 66 
Mclntire v. Prvor. 173 U.S. 38, 19 S. Ct. 352, 43 L.Ed. 66 
Standard of Review: Clearly Erroneous 
Issue No. 5: Because appellee's counsel knew or should have known appellee's 
claims were barred, inter alia, by the dismissal, by the statute of limitations at the time 
appellee attempted to litigate, both appellee and his counsel are subject to the sanctions 
imposed by Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Rimensburger v. Rimensburger. 841 P.2d 709, 710 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) 
Tavlor v. Estate of Tavlor. 770 P.2d 163, 171 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 
Steiner v.Warren. 765 F.2d 95 (7th Cir. 1985) 
Van Berkel v. Fox Farm and Road Machinery. 581 F.Supp. 1248 (D. Minn. 1984) 
Schonev v. Memorial Estates. Inc.. 863 P.2d 59, 62 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) 
Standard of Review: Correction of Error 
CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
1. §78-12-23(2) An action may be brought within six years upon any contract, 
obligation, or liability founded upon an instrument in writing . . . . 
2. §78-12-40 If any action is commenced within due time and a judgment thereon 
for the plaintiff is reversed, or if the plaintiff fails in such action or upon a cause of action 
otherwise than upon the merits, and the time limited either by law or conract for 
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commencing the same shall have expired, the plaintiff, or if he dies and the cause of 
action survives, his representatives, may commence a new action within one year after the 
reversal or failure. 
3. Rule 4-103(3) Utah Rules of Judicial Administration. 
4. Rule 60(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
5. Article I, Section 7: No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property 
without due process of law. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This case arises from a written contract to purchase an airplane. The contract went 
into default on March 20, 1987. A complaint was filed in the Third District Court on 
December 22, 1989 (Case No. 890907678) against appellant. [R - 1 thru 4]. Appellant 
Stanton was never served [R-12]. 
Six months later an Order to Show Cause was issued by the Third District Court on 
July 18, 1980. [R - 19 thru 20]. None of the parties appeared and the Third District Court 
dismissed the complaint without prejudice. [R-21]. 
Plaintiff did not move to vacate the dismissal pursuant to Rule 4-103(3) Utah Rules 
of Judicial Administration and Rule 60(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff did 
not file an appeal within thirty days of the dismissal. Plaintiff did not refile the action 
within one year of the dismissal. 
The case sat inactive for four years and four months. Then plaintiffs attorney was 
able, by an ex parte order, to get the case transferred to the Third Circuit Court for trial 
-4-
with the transfer order vacating the dismissal. [R-36 and 37]. All this was without notice 
of the court's intent. Transfer of the case and the vacating of the dismissal was 
accomplished sixteen months after the statute of limitations on written contracts had 
expired. 
Appellant filed a motion to dismiss for want of subject matter jurisdiction over the 
appellant. Appellant's motion was denied. The court found jurisdiction without stating 
any findings of fact or conclusions of law on an ex parte order that had never been 
noticed up for hearing by the District Court. 
Subsequently the case went to trial where plaintiff prevailed and appellant objected 
to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The court signed those documents and 
the judgment without ever hearing appellant's objections. Both parties requested a 
decision on the objections which the court ignored, leaving both sides hanging since 
March 16, 1995. 
Appellant received Notice of Garnishment on September 17, 1998. Appellant 
immediately filed an objection and motion to dismiss. The court denied the objection and 
motion when it entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order making the 
case ripe for appeal. 
Appellant then timely appealed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Plaintiffs complaint was filed 22 December 1989, as against the named 
Defendants based upon a contract default effective 20 March 1987. Said complaint was 
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served on defendant Fair on or about 25 January 1990 and answered by him on 31 
January 1990. Defendant Fair was served but defendant Stanton was not served and has 
never been served. [R-12]. 
2. Six months later, on 17 July 1990, an order to show cause why the case should 
not be dismissed for failure to prosecute was issued. None of the parties appeared on 
August 24, 1990 for the scheduled hearing. [R-19 thru 20]. 
3. The court stated in the Order to Show Cause, "Failure to appear will be 
considered aquiescence in entry of an Order of Dismissal without further notice 
(Emphasis added). [R-21]. 
4. Neither side appeared and the Court dismissed the case on the 31st day of August, 
1990, without prejudice. 
5. Notwithstanding the finality of said order dismissing this case, commencing later 
that same day and continuing through 6 May 1991, no less than five (5) additional 
pleadings were unnecessarily and improperly filed with the court with regard to the case: 
(i) on 31 August 1990, a notice of withdrawal of Fair's counsel, Frank S. Warner; (ii) on 
4 September 1990, a notice to appoint counsel; (iii) on 25 March 1991, a certificate of 
readiness for trial; (iv) on 16 April 1991, a minute entry transferring the case to the circuit 
court; and (v) on 6 May 1991, a letter from withdrawn counsel, Frank S. Warner, to 
remove counsel from notice; all of which pleadings were nevertheless accepted for filing, 
the prior dismissal of the case notwithstanding. [R-21] 
6. Plaintiff did not under Rule 4-103(3), Utah Rules of Judicial Administration 
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move to vacate the dismissal pursuant to a Rule 60(b) motion pursuant to the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. 
7. Plaintiff did not file an appeal within thirty days of the dismissal. 
8. Plaintiff did not pursuant to U.C.A. 78-12-40, refile the action within one year of 
the dismissal. 
9. The case sat inactive from the dismissal date, August 31, 1990 to December 6, 
1994. 
10. On December 6, 1994, the court without notice of its intent, issued an ex parte 
order, prepared by plaintiffs attorney, signs an order transferring the case to the Circuit 
Court for trial. Four years, four months after the court had dismissed the case and sixteen 
months after the statute of limitations on the contract had expired. 
11. The order is marked duplicate and in part stated the prior order of the court is 
set aside. [R-36& 37]. | 
12. Defendant Stanton on January 21, 1995, filed a motion to dismiss for want of 
subject matter jurisdiction over the case and personal jurisdiction over the person of 
defendant Stanton. Defendant Fair's whereabouts was unknown and to this date is still 
unknown. [R-84]. 
13. On February 24, 1995, Judge Michael K. Burton denied defendant Stanton's 
motion, stating only, "This court believes it has jurisdiction to allow this case to continue 
to be prosecuted." 
14. The case went to trial over defendant Stanton's objection on October 21, 1995. 
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15. The court took the case under advisement and later entered its Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law in favor of the plaintiff. 
16. The court required plaintiff to prepare the documents for the court's signature. 
17. Plaintiff presented his written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law directly 
to the court and mailing a copy to defendant Stanton, on October 25, 1995. 
18. Defendant Stanton submitted his objections to the proposed Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law on November 3, 1995. [R-251 thru 262]. 
19. Plaintiffs attorney submitted a Notice for Decision on December 11, 1995. [R-
276]. 
20. Either side having received no response from the court on the objection, 
defendant Stanton submitted a request for a decision on March 16, 1995. [R-280]. 
21. Defendant Stanton was never notified by either plaintiff or the court of any 
decision made or action taken until he received a Notice of Garnishment on September 
17, 1998. [R-282] 
22. Defendant Stanton filed an objection to the Writ of Garnishment and a motion 
for dismissal on September 18, 1998. [R-285 thru 343]. 
23. Hearing was held on defendant Stanton's objection and motion to dismiss on 
October 18, 1998. 
24. The court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order denying 
defendant Stanton's objection and motion to dismiss on October 28, 1998. [R-287 thru 
389]. 
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25. Defendant Stanton then timely appealed. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The court divested itself of jurisdiction when it dismissed the plaintiffs case on 
August 31, 1990. The court never regained jurisdiction for plaintiffs failure to move to 
vacate the dismissal; appeal the dismissal or refile the case within one year, after the 
dismissal. 
There is no basis in law for the court, sua sponte, to resurrect this case through an ex 
parte order, vacating the dismissal without notice or hearing four years after dismissing 
the case. 
The lack of jurisdiction is fatal to a court's authority to decide a case with respect to 
any particular party. No valid complaint existed at the time of trial. No valid judgment 
existed at the time of garnishment of appellant's wages. Therefore this court has no 
choice but to reverse and remand to the District Court with instructions to enter a 
dismissal in favor of the appellant. 
Plaintiffs claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The dismissal by the 
Third District Court constituted a final adjudication upon the merits which is an absolute 
bar to any subsequent actions. 
Plaintiffs claims are absolutely barred by the statute of limitations. The six year 
statute of limitations on the defaulted contract had expired sixteen months prior to the ex 
parte order vacating the court's dismissal. Appellant has a right to be free from state 
claims that are not prosecutable. 
-9-
Plaintiffs claims are barred by the doctrine of waiver, laches, and estoppel, 
plaintiffs unreasonable delay in prosecuting his case from the lack of diligence and the 
resulting injury to appellant. Plaintiffs claims were absolutely barred on November 14, 
1994 by the equitable doctrine of laches and that guilt was not overcome by the purported 
transfer of that claim to the Circuit Court. 
The facts set forth within issues 1 through 4, clearly establish and prove blatant, 
self-evident violations of Rule 11 which are easily capable of giving rise to the 




THIS COURT LACKS SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OVER 
THE CASE AND PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON 
OF APPELLANT STANTON IN LIGHT OF THE FACTS THAT (i) 
APPELLANT STANTON WAS NEVER SERVED, AND (ii) THE 
PREVIOUS INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL BY THE DISTRICT COURT 
PURSUANT TO RULE 41(b) CONSTITUTED AN "ADJUDICATION 
UPON THE MERITS," THUS RENDERING PLAINTIFF'S 
COMPLAINT INCAPABLE OF BEING EITHER AMENDED OR 
"CONTINUED." 
In light of the facts in this matter, the Court's expressed belief of jurisdiction is not 
only hatched in error, but tantamount to the acquisition of jurisdiction by fiction, which it 
clearly cannot do. As jurisdiction is fundamental to the court's power to act, it is properly 
raised at any time, and once challenged it must be clearly proven. The District Court 
divested itself of jurisdiction in this matter when it dismissed plaintiffs case on 24 
August 1990 and entered its final order to that effect on 31 August 1990. [R-4] That 
divestiture of jurisdiction became conclusive when plaintiff failed to timely file a notice 
of appeal, move to vacate the dismissal under Rule 4-103, URJA and Rule 60(b), URCP; 
and refile the case within one year of the dismissal. Indeed plaintiff did none of these 
requirements that could have reinstated his case. It is therefore appropriate to review the 
appellate decisions of this state with respect to such involuntary dismissals made by the 
court upon its own motion. Rule 41, U.R.C.P., governs the dismissal of actions and 
subdivision (b) thereof delineates the effect of the involuntary dismissals where it 
provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 
-11-
ff(b)... [if the court renders judgment on the merits against the plaintiff, the 
court shall make findings as provided in Rule 52(a). Unless the court in its 
order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and 
any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of 
jurisdiction or for improper venue or for lack of an indispensable party, 
operates as an adjudication upon the merits." (Emphasis added.) 
The District Court's order, dated 31 August 1990, provides as follows: 
'The Court having ordered the parties in this case to appear on August 24, 
1990 and show cause why the case should not be dismissed for failure to 
prosecute, and the parties having failed to appear, IT IS ORDERED, that 
this case is dismissed without prejudice." [R-19 & 20]. 
Thus, it may be plainly seen that the district court duly dismissed this case as of the date 
indicated in its order, and that such dismissal clearly '...[operated] as an adjudication upon 
the merits1 pursuant to Rule 41(b) governing such dismissals. See also Steiner v. State, 
495 P.2d 809 (Utah, 1972); Nichols v. State, 554 P.2d 231 (Utah, 1976) (An order of 
dismissal is a final adjudication, and thereafter a complaint cannot be amended). In 
reviewing cases involuntarily dismissed by the court, the Utah Court of Appeals has held 
as follows: 
"In reviewing involuntary dismissals, the appellate court must give great 
weight to the findings made and the inferences drawn by the trial judge, but 
must reject his findings if dearly erroneous. On the other hand, it does not 
defer to conclusions of law but reviews them for correctness." Southern 
Title Guaranty Co. v. Bethers. 761 P.2d951 (Ut.Ct.App., 1988). 
See also Mostrong v. Jackson.866P.2d573 (Ut. Ct. App.),cert.den.,_P.2d_(Utah, 1994); 
Sorenson v. Kennecott-Utah Copper Corp. 873 P.2d 1.141 (Ut.CtApp., 1994). Alta Indus. 
Ltd. v. Hurst 846 P.2d 1282 (Utah, 1993); Petrie v. General Contracting Co. 413 P.2d 
600 (Utah, 1966); Petty v. Gindv Mfg. Corp.. 404 P.2d 30 (Utah, 1965); Child y. 
Havward. 400 P.2d 758 (Utah, 1965); Davis v. Pavne & Day. Inc..34S P.2d 337 (Utah, 
1960); Lawrence v. Bamberger R. R.. 282 P.2d 335 (Utah, 1955); Martin v. Stevens. 243 
P.2d 747 (Utah, 1952). 
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The clearly erroneous standard of review also derives from Rule 52(a), which 
provides that "... findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall 
I 
not be set aside unless dearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity 
of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." 
As it was not error for the district court to involuntarily dismiss Plaintiffs case for 
the cause shown, that finding is thus entitled to great weight as an adjudication on the 
merits, as Rule 41(b) provides, and is amply reflected as such in the decisional law 
rendered by the appellate courts of this state for more than four years. Absent any 
subsequent action on the part of the Plaintiff following the dismissal, and upon expiration 
of the time for the filing of an appeal thereafter, there is plainly and simply no basis in 
law for the district court to attempt to resurrect the case at this time under the guise of a 
purported "assignment" to this Court where there is clearly no case to assign. Absent a 
viable case or controversy even capable of being transferred, much less to be adjudicated 
on the merits, any action taken by this Court in respect to this matter in light of the clear 
jurisdictional bars, would therefore be a nullity and void, and of no legal force or effect. 
Likewise, any judgment rendered under these circumstances would be equally null and 
void. Moreover, these inherent jurisdictional defects are doubly fatal where they 
necessarily deprive Plaintiff of standing. As standing is also jurisdictional in nature it, 
too, must be proven when challenged and, as here, may be raised at any time. Thus, in 
the clear absence of jurisdiction, both subject matter and personal, and in the further light 
of Plaintiffs lack of standing, any decision or judgment rendered by this Court in the 
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instant matter could only fly in the face of the Utah Supreme Court's decision wherein it 
held as follows: 
"[I]f jurisdiction is lacking, the judgment cannot stand without denying due 
process to the one against whom it runs." State ot Utah, Department of 
Social Services v Viiil. 784 P. 2d 1130, 1132 (Utah, 1989). 
In arriving at the foregoing decision, the Supreme Court explained that there are 
two "s of jurisdiction required by the court before it can rule on a matter. The first of 
these is subject matter jurisdiction, which is the authority and competency of the court to 
decide the controversy at issue. The second is personal jurisdiction, which is the court's 
ability to exercise its power over the person for purposes of adjudicating that person's 
rights. A lack of either type of jurisdiction is fatal to a court's authority to decide a case 
with respect to any particular party. Id. Forty three years earlier, with respect to Rule 
60(b) motions raising a collateral attack on void judgments, the Supreme Court had 
similarly held as follows: 
"It is a basic rule that a judgment is void and subject to collateral attack if 
lack of jurisdiction in the court appears on the face of the record." Bowen v. 
Olson, 122 Utah 66, 246 P.2d 602 (1932). 
Since the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure were fashioned after the Federal Rules, it 
is proper to examine decisions under the federal rules to determine the meanings thereof. 
Winagar v. Slim Olson. Inc., 252 P.2d 205 (Utah, 1953). It is equally appropriate, 
therefore, to examine as well the Original Practice Commentary with respect to the 
federal rules. With regard to the issue of subject matter and personam jurisdiction, 
Commentary C4-3 is likewise instructive where it provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 
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"Rule 4 is concerned only with jurisdiction of the person, including the 
several categories of "remf,jurisdiction (see Commentary C4-29), which are 
in essence subcategories of personal jurisdiction. It determines how the 
court obtains jurisdiction over a given individual so as to make its judgment 
binding upon him. It is to be distinguished from subject matter jurisdiction. 
Subject matter jurisdiction is concerned with the court's power to hear a 
given category of case. ...[A]nd it's not even necessary for the defendant to 
raise the objection to subject matter jurisdiction. The court can raise it sua 
sponte, and at any time. Rule 12(h)(3). [See Utah Rule 12(h)(2) (1995).] 
Hence the vastness of the subject and the acres of cases on subject matter 
jurisdiction that swell the annotations. 
"The ultimate source of federal subject matter jurisdiction is the 
Constitution itself, where Article 3, § 2, lists its outer limits. The contents 
of the list are familiar: the case "arises under" federal law (commonly called 
"federal question" jurisdiction), or is in admiralty, or the parties are 
domiciled in different states ("diversity of citizenship" jurisdiction), or the 
United States is a party, etc. But the constitution is not self-executing. It 
takes an Act of Congress — a statute — actually to confer the jurisdiction on 
a district court, and the presence of subject matter jurisdiction, usually with 
a citation of the jurisdiction-conferring statute, must be demonstrated by the 
plaintiff in every case. The plaintiff fulfills this requirement simply by 
choosing the appropriate paragraph from Form 2 ("Allegation of 
Jurisdiction") of the FRCP's Appendix of Forms, and opening his complaint 
with it. I 
"Statutes that confer subject matter jurisdiction on the district courts 
abound. Most but by no means all of them are in §§ 1330-1364 of Title 28 
of the United States Code. But none are in the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Nor could they be. Subject matter jurisdiction is altogether 
barred from address in the FRCP. See Rule 82. The reason is that in giving 
the U. S. Supreme Court the rule-making power in 28 USCA § 2072, 
Congress wanted all rules restricted to matters of procedure, which subject 
matter jurisdiction is not. 
"Personal jurisdiction is, however. And with only a few exceptions, to be 
noted, personal jurisdiction in respect of both service of process and 
jurisdictional basis (sometimes described as amenability to service), has 
been left to the U. S. Supreme Court to govern by rule. Rule 4 is the rule 
that governs. ...Subject matter and personal jurisdiction are separate 
subjects and Rule 4 is concerned only with the latter. | 
"An important procedural distinction between the two jurisdictional 
categories is that while an objection to subject matter jurisdiction is 
unwaivable and can be raised at any time, see Rule 12(h)(3), an objection to 
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personal jurisdiction is waivable and quite easily waived. The procedure 
for asserting and preserving an objection to personal jurisdiction is 
discussed in Commentary C4-39." Original Practice Commentary, C4-3, pp. 
24-25 (1991). 
Rule 12(h)(2), U.R.C.P., provides in pertinent part: 
"(h)... (2) that, whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or 
otherwise that the court lack jurisdiction over the subject matter, the court 
shall dismiss the action. The objection or defense, if made at the trial, shall 
be disposed of as provided in Rule 15(b) in the light of any evidence that 
may have been received." Ibid. 
As in federal practice operating under the U. S. Constitution, the ultimate source of 
subject matter jurisdiction in courts of this state is the Utah Constitution. Thus it takes an 
act of the legislature — a statute ~ actually to confer the jurisdiction on a court, and the 
presence of subject matter jurisdiction must likewise be demonstrated by the plaintiff in 
every case. But even so, the foregoing assumes that a plaintiff is not otherwise barred 
from prosecuting his claims by the operation of other applicable law. In the instant case, 
or more correctly, no case at all where Plaintiffs complaint has been dismissed and a final 
order to that effect has been executed, clearly no valid complaint exists. Absent the 
existence of a valid and meritorious complaint in the district court, it necessarily follows 
that in light of such absence there was simply nothing to transfer to the Circuit Court 
beyond a paper nullity. Moreover, since the dismissal of the case no further complaint 
was filed or duly served, thereby providing a further basis to demonstrate the lack of 
either type of jurisdiction, thus presenting an insurmountable, and fatal due process issue 
arising from the lack of notice and opportunity for a hearing. Therefore, it was proper 
-16-
and appropriate to appear specifically at that time for the limited purpose of challenging 
this Court's jurisdiction respecting both subject matter and in personam. As no valid 
complaint existed, nor could there have been in light of these facts, it necessarily follows 
that neither could service have even been attempted and, indeed, none was. Thus, since 
on and after the date of dismissal of the case there was simply no case to transfer from the 
District court and, therefore, this Court has no choice but to reverse and remand this case 
back to the District Court with orders to enter a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS ARE ABSOLUTELY BARRED BY THE 
DOCTRINE OF RES ADJUDICATA. 
The foregoing jurisdictional bars notwithstanding, even had Plaintiff chosen to 
refile and serve his complaint prior to 20 March 1993, he would have necessarily been 
barred by res judicata owing to the inescapable fact that the complaint involved the same 
issues and parties with no substantive or factual differences in either, and the same having 
been previously dismissed constituted a final adjudication upon merits. Steiner. Nichols. 
supras. Res judicata is plainly defined as the: 
"Rule that a final judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction on 
the merits is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies, and, 
as to them, constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action involving the 
same claim, demand or cause of action. It is the sum and substance of the 
whole rule that a matter once judicially decided is finally decided. See also 
Collateral estoppel doctrine; Final decision rule; Issue preclusion." Black's, 
Abridged Sixth Ed., p. 905. 
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POINT III 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS ARE ABSOLUTELY BARRED BY THE 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing jurisdictional and res judicata bars, Plaintiff was 
further barred from prosecuting his claims under the contract default since anytime after 
20 March 1993, pursuant to the Utah statute of limitations governing written agreements 
as codified at § 78-12-23(2), Utah Code Ann. The time for commencement of actions 
generally is codified at § 78-12-1, which provides as follows: 
Civil actions may be commenced only within the periods prescribed in this 
chapter, after the cause of action has accrued, except in specific cases where 
a different limitation is prescribed by statute." 
The statute specifically excepting the case of Plaintiff s contract provides, in pertinent 
part, as follows: 
78-12-23. Within six years - Mesne profits of real property -
Instrument in Writing - Distribution of criminal proceeds to victim. 
Within six years: 
"(2) An action upon any contract, obligation, or liability founded upon an 
instrument in writing, except those mentioned in Section 78-12-22." 
In the instant matter, Plaintiffs contract was deemed in default on 20 March 1987, 
thus any action thereupon necessarily had to be filed on or before 20 March 1993. 
Although Plaintiff timely filed his action on 22 December 1989, and duly served his 
complaint on Defendant Fair on or about 25 January 1990, the case was nevertheless 
involuntarily dismissed on 24 August 1990 for failure to prosecute and a final order to 
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that effect was entered on the 31st following. No objections were filed with respect to the 
dismissal nor was any appeal timely taken therefrom. Neither were any motions timely 
filed pursuant to Rule 60 or any other rule seeking to set aside the judgment of dismissal 
nor was any motion timely made for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. But even if a motion 
for a new trial had been made, albeit out of time, the court's only alternative would have 
been to deny the same. Burgers v. Maiben. 652 P. 2d 1320 (Utah, 1982). No such 
motions were made, however, and therefore the judgment of dismissal was final and 
binding as an adjudication upon the merits. Rule 41(b); Steiner^ Nichols, supras. 
Now, only on 14 November 1994, does the district court, at Plaintiffs insistence, 
attempt to reinstate the matter by purporting to reopen the case which was dismissed more 
than four (4) years earlier., albeit solely by providing a duplicate of its former transfer 
order of 16 April 1991 to this Court, and notwithstanding the clear jurisdictional bars so 
manifestly evident both then and more so even now. While the transfer, even then, was 
legally invalid owing to the fact that the case had been finally dismissed forty-eight 
months earlier on 31 August 1990, to presuppose that it could somehow be resurrected at 
that point in time simply defies all logical legal reasoning. But even if there were no 
other persuasive legal issues to contend with in this matter, the impropriety of such 
attempted transfer at that late date is exceeded only by the angle at which it stands the 
statute of limitations on its head. 
Because the Circuit Court believed it has jurisdiction to allow the case to continue 
to be prosecuted, it is therefore appropriate to note what the U. S. Supreme Court has held 
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with regard to the statute of limitations as the Court has, many times, been called upon to 
decide cases which addressed actions, as here, that were time-barred on statute of 
limitations grounds. It stated that even substantive claims will be barred after a point at 
which the delay of a plaintiff to prosecute an action disturbs this fundamental principal of 
a well-ordered judicial system. For example, in the case of Board of Regents v. Tomanio. 
446 U.S. 478,64 L.Ed.2d 440, 100 S.Ct. 1790 (1980), the Supreme Court stated as 
follows: 
"Statutes of limitations are not simply technicalities. On the contrary, they 
have long been respected as fundamental to a well-ordered judicial system. 
...Thus in the judgment of most legislatures and courts, there comes a point 
at which the delay of a plaintiff in asserting a claim is sufficiently likely 
either to impair the accuracy of the fact-finding process or to upset settled 
expectations that a substantive claim win be- barred without respect to 
whether it is meritorious." 64 L.Ed.2d at 449. 
See also: Robertson v. Wegmann. 436 U,S. 584, 56 L.Ed.2d 554, 98 S.Ct. 1991: Johnson 
v. Railway Express Agency. Inc. 421 U.S. 454, 44 L.Ed.2d 295, 95 S.Ct. 1716; Monroe v. 
Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 5 L.Ed. 2d 492, 81 S.Ct. 473. 
These few decisions, among numerous others, were all based upon long-standing 
precedent. For example, in United States v. Kubrick. 444 U.S. 111, 117, 100 S.Ct. 352, 
356-57, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979), the High Court quoted its World War 11 decision in 
Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency. 321 U.S. 342, 64 S.Ct. 582, 586, 88 
L.Ed. 788 (1944), where it had then held that: 
"[i]t is unjust to fail to put the adversary on notice to defend within a 
specified period of time and that fthe right to be free of stale claims in time 
comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them." 321 U.S. at 349. 
Notwithstanding the lack of service in the instant matter, statutes of limitations are 
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essential laws that limit the amount of time in which an action may be brought in some 
cause. Upon expiration of that time, as in the present case, no cause for relief can lie. 
While Plaintiff could well have had recourse at the time of the dismissal by filing a 
motion on one or more grounds, or by timely filing a notice of appeal therefrom, for 
whatever reason he chose not to do so. Accordingly, the right to be free of Plaintiffs stale 
claims has prevails over Plaintiffs right to prosecute them. 
POINT IV 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS ARE FURTHER BARRED BY THE 
DOCTRINE OF WAIVER, LACHES, AND ESTOPPEL. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing jurisdictional res judicata, and statute of limitations 
bars, Plaintiffs claims are still further barred by the doctrine of waiver, laches, and 
estoppel owing to Plaintiffs unreasonable delay and the resultant injury to Defendant 
arising therefrom. 
The "'Doctrine of laches" is based upon the maxim that equity aids the vigilant and 
not those who slumber on their rights." It is the "unreasonable or unexplained delay in 
asserting [a] right which works disadvantage to another. Laches requires an element of 
estoppel or neglect which has operated to prejudice of defendant. "Black's, Abridged 
Sixth Ed., p. 606. In this regard, Bouvier's1 indicates as follows: 
f\..[t]his doctrine is based upon the grounds of public policy which requires 
for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims, Mackall v. 
Casilear.137 U.S. 556, 11 S.Ct. 178, 34 L.Ed. 776, and The question 
1
 Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 3 vol. Ed., (1914) 
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whether one is precluded from equitable relief by the staleness of his 
demand is for the court and not for the jury.' Raymond v. FlaveL 27 Ore. 
219, 40 P. 158. It goes on to state that 'Courts of equity withhold relief 
from those who have delayed the assertion of their claims for an 
unreasonable time, and the mere fact that suit was brought within a 
reasonable time does not prevent the application of the doctrine of laches 
when there is a want of diligence in the prosecution.1 A Is op v. Riker, 155 
U.S. 440,15 S.Ct. 162, 39 L.Ed. 218; Hagerman v. Bates. 5 Cal.App. 391, 
38 P. 1100. The question of laches depends not upon the fact that a certain 
definite time has elapsed since the cause of action accrued, but upon 
whether, under all the circumstances, the plaintiff is chargeable with want 
of due diligence in not instituting the proceedings sooner/ Townsend v. 
Vanderwerker.160 U.S. 171, 16 S.Ct. 2,58, 40 L.Ed. 383; Mclntire v. Prvor. 
173 U.S. 38, 19 S.Ct. 352, 43 L.Ed. 606; 'It is not measured by the statute of 
limitations.' Alsop. supra. 
Laches embodies the fundamental principle that "he who seeks equity must do 
equity," therefore, "having sought equity, it is incumbent upon plaintiff to do equity." 
Coleman Co.. Inc. v. Southwest Field Irrigation Co.. 584 P-2d 883, 884 (Utah 1978); 
accord, Carbon Canal Co. v. Sanpete Water Users Assn., 425 P.2d 405, (Utah, 1967). As 
Defendant properly submitted a motion to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds, he thus duly 
met his burden under the rationale of Walker v. Walker. 404 P.2d 253, 257 (Utah, 1963), 
wherein the Supreme Court stated: 
"Burden of taking some affirmative action should be on him who accuses 
the other of delay and unless he has taken such action or in some manner 
put other party on notice that action is required, he cannot take advantage of 
the delay." Id. 
In further clarification of the foregoing as respecting the instant case, it is 
instructive to note the decision of the Supreme Court of Hawaii wherein it stated: 
"Equitable doctrine of laches applies where long acquiescence in assertion 
of adverse rights has occurred,... or when, during inexcusable delay 
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evidence has become obscured and, under circumstances of case, it is too 
late to ascertain merits of controversy." Anderson v. Anderson. 585 P.2d 
938, 947 (Hawaii, 1978). 
See also Brabenderv. Kit Mfg. Co.. 568 P.2d 547 (Mont., 1977) ("Laches" is negligence 
in assertion of a right; it exists when there has been an unexplained delay of such duration 
or character as to render enforcement of asserted right inequitable); Clark v. Chipman.5\0 
P.2d 1257, 212 Kan. 259 (1973) ("Laches" is an equitable device designed to bar stale 
and courts of equity will regard long passage of time in asserting claims with disfavor 
apart from any particular statute of limitations); Longshaw v. Corbitt. 420 P.2d 980,4 
Ariz.App. 408 (1966) (The elements necessary to constitute laches are lack of diligence 
on the part of one and injury to another due to lack of diligence). 
The record in this case dearly indicates that Plaintiffs claims suffered from the 
lack of diligence and the resultant injury arose out of being forced to defend against 
barred and stale claims as the direct and proximate result of Plaintiff s inexcusable delay, 
in connection with the district court's clear abuse of discretion by resurrecting the case at 
Plaintiffs mere insistence by, without more, a "transfer" to the Circuit Court. Indeed, in 
the instant matter the whereabouts of the only Defendant ever served in this matter was 
presently unknown. Moreover, nothing in the record indicated that Plaintiff had even 
attempted to locate Defendant Fair, much less pursuing this essential activity with 
diligence. But even if Plaintiff had exercised reasonable diligence, the plain fact remains 
that Defendant Fair has not been located, much less been served. Thus Plaintiffs case 
was still further inhibited by the subsequent disappearance of an essential party to the 
action, thereby rendering plaintiff significantly more susceptible to the affirmative 
defense of laches, waiver, and estoppel - the lack of service notwithstanding. In light of 
those facts, to even presuppose for a moment that the Circuit Court was vested in any way 
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with so much as the slightest trace of jurisdiction would be tantamount to a rewriting of 
the entire history of American jurisprudence on these shores. When the Circuit Court 
continued further it served to magnify the district court's already-clear abuse of discretion 
to an immeasurable and unconscionable degree. 
The appellate courts of this state have consistently held that trial courts may 
exercise broad discretion so long as the decision is within the confines of legal 
precedence, Whitehead v.Whitehead. 836 P.2d 814 (Ut.Ct.App., 1992); Bingham v. 
Bingham. 872 P.2d 1065 (Ut.Ct.App., 1994), controlling Utah case law teaches that 
"correctness" of those decisions means the appellate court decides the matter for itself and 
does not defer in any degree to the trial judge's determination of the law, State v. Pena. 
869 P.2d 932 (Utah, 1994). See also Howell v. Howell 806 P.2d 1209 (Ut.Ct.App.), cert 
denied, 817 P.2d 325 (Utah, 1991). This is because appellate courts have traditionally 
been seen as having the power and duty to say what the law is and to ensure that it is 
uniform throughout the jurisdiction. Pena. 869 P.2d at 936 (citing Charles Alan Wright, 
The Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41 Minn. L. Rev. 751, 779 (1957). See 
State v. Thurman. 846 P. 2d 1256, 1266 (Utah, 1993). For examples of conclusions of 
law as they pertain to the instant matter, see Reed v.Reed 806 P.2d 1182, 1184 n.3 (Utah, 
1991) (whether a person has been properly served with process); Rimensburger v. 
Rimensburzer. 841 P.2d 709, 710 (Ut.Ct.App., 1992) (whether a court has subject matter 
jurisdiction); see also Van Per Stappen v. Van Per Stappen. 815 P.2d 1335,1337 (Ut. Ct. 
App., 1991) (same); and Smith v. Smith. 793 P.2d 407,409 (Ut.Ct.App., 1990) (whether 
-24-
res judicata applies). 
Abuse of the court's discretion has been defined as acting beyond the bounds of 
reasonability. State v. Larsen. 865 P.2d 1355,1361 (Utah, 1993; Nay v. General Motors 
Corp.. 850 P.2d 1260, 1262 (Utah, 1993); State v. Archuleta. 850 P.2d 1232, 1241 (Utah), 
cert, denied 114 S.Ct. 476 (1993); State v. Dunn , 850 P.2d 1201, 1221 (Utah, 1993); 
State v. Hamilton. 827 P.2d 232, 239-40 (Utah, 1992). Clearly, the attempt by the district 
court, at the insistence of the Plaintiff, to reopen the case in the face of the numerous 
applicable bars, and even then solely on the basis of a duplicate issuance of the long-
dormant, unadjudicated, four year-old "transfer" of a previously dismissed case to the 
Circuit Court, cannot be construed as anything but an intentional act to absolutely defy 
the bounds of reason, conscience, and due process ~ and particularly in light of the fact 
that Plaintiff was there without standing and there were no Defendants present solely due 
to Plaintiffs gross negligence and dear lack of diligence, thereby transforming the "hall of 
justice" into a castle of dreams that literally staggers all legal imaginations. 
Thus, it is all too plainly evident that not only has Plaintiff been grossly negligent 
in asserting his claim for an unconscionable period, but as a result of that negligence, in 
connection with his attempt to litigate the long-since dismissed case, Defendant has been 
unduly and unconscionably prejudiced by being supposedly forced to defend against 
nothing more substantial than Plaintiffs spacious legal theories and faint memories of an 
arguably once-valid case, and therefore suffered irreparable harm and injury by plaintiffs 
claims not being barred for the clear and well-settled legal principles herein set forth. 
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Therefore, it is appropriate and proper to direct this Court's attention to 
Defendant's right to raise the equitable defense of laches, which is contingent upon the 
establishment of two sole elements: (1) the lack of diligence on the part of plaintiff; and 
(2) an injury to defendant owing to such lack of diligence. Papanikolas Brothers 
Enterprises v. Sugarhouse Shopping Center Associates. 535 P.2d 1256, 1260 (Utah, 
1975); cited Leaver v. Grose. 610 P.2d 1.262, 1264 (Utah, 1980); Plateau Mining Co. v. 
Utah Division of State Lands and Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 731 (Utah, 1990); Sandy City v. 
Salt Lake County. 827 P.2d 227, 230 n.5 (Utah, 1992). Both of those elements are 
abundantly evident in this case, together with the unclean hands of the Plaintiff owing to 
his open and attempt to litigate a claim known by him to be barred, the untimeliness and 
lack of service of process notwithstanding. 
In sum, laches developed as an equitable analog to legal statutes of limitation and 
operates, when found, as a bar to an action, not as an element to diminish an award. See 
G. Dobbs, Remedies, 43. "The basis of laches in equity is unreasonable delay and lack 
of diligence extending for so long a time or under circumstances that it would be 
inequitable to grant relief Rhoads v. Albertson Is, Inc.. 574 P.2d 114, 116 (Colo. App., 
1977), reversed, 582 P.2d 1049. 'Laches bars a recovery when there has been a delay by 
one party causing a disadvantage to the other party." Papanikolas, supra. 535 P.2d at 
1260. The record in this matter dearly demonstrates Plaintiffs long acquiescence in the 
assertion of adverse rights pursuant to an alleged claim where Plaintiff has waited for 
more than four (4) years since dismissal of his case before attempting to act in that regard. 
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Anderson, supra, 585 P.2d at 947. Moreover, Defendant Fair, the only Defendant that 
was ever served in this matter, was and is wholly unaware of these proceedings as his 
present whereabouts is unknown. To hold Appellant Stanton, who was never served in 
this action, responsible for Plaintiffs barred claims would work an unconscionable 
prejudice and thereby impose irreparable harm and injury. Plaintiff clearly knew or 
should have known that his claim was absolutely barred on 14 November 1994 by the 
equitable doctrine of laches and that guilt was not overcome by the purported "transfer" 
of that claim to the Circuit Court by the district court at Plaintiffs mere, unsupported 
insistence. Thus, appellant is properly entitled to raise, and hereby does raise, this 
affirmative defense at this time where Plaintiffs claims are dearly shown to be stale, 
untimely raised, and therefore barred in to to. Therefore and accordingly, the only 
recourse this Court has in light of the foregoing is to reverse and remand ordering the 
District Court to enter its final judgment of dismissal in favor of appellant. 
POINT V 
BECAUSE PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL KNEW OR SHOULD HAVE 
KNOWN PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS WERE BARRED, INTER ALIA, 
BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AT THE TIME PLAINTIFF 
NOW CHOOSES TO ATTEMPT TO LITIGATE THEM, BOTH HE 
AND HIS CLIENT ARE SUBJECT TO THE SANCTIONS IMPOSED 
BYRULE11,U.R.C.P. 
When reviewing a trial court's sanction determination pursuant to Rule 11 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, appellate courts review the trial court's findings of fact 
under a clearly erroneous standard. The trial court's conclusion that Rule 11 was violated 
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is reviewed under a correction of error standard, Rimensburger supra,841P.2d at 711, 
Jeschkev. Willis 811 P.2d 202, 204 (Ut.Ct.App., 1991); Taylor v. Estate of Taylor. 770 
P.2d 163,171 (Ut.Ct App., 1991), and the trial court's determination of the type and 
amount of sanctions to be imposed is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. In 
this regard the Utah Court of Appeals has held: 
"[I]f a Rule 11 violation is shown, an appropriate sanction is mandated, and 
we will affirm the particular sanction imposed by the trial court, including 
the reasonableness of any fee award, absent an abuse of discretion.11 Taylor, 
770P.2datl71. 
Thus, the Court of Appeals makes it clear that "if a Rule 11 violation is shown, " then "an 
appropriate sanction is mandated." The instant matter is abundant with violations dearly 
shown to be subject to Rule 11 sanctions and it is therefore mandatory that appropriate 
sanctions be imposed, as indicated by the decisional law of this state. 
Sanctions against both the attorney and client under the rule have been imposed 
where the attorney knew or should have known a claim was time-barred. Steinle 
v.Warren. 765 F.2cl 95 (7th Cir., 1985); Van Berkel v. Fox Farm and Road Machinery. 
581 F.Supp. 1248 (D.Minn., 1994). Further, even in cases where the issues involved 
affirmative defenses, the fact that a defense is affirmative has not relieved counsel of the 
Rule 11 responsibilities in other contexts. See, e.g., Southern Leasing Partners. Ltd. v. 
Bludworth. 109 F.R.D. 643 (S.D.Miss., 1986) (suit barred by res judicata); Hasty v. 
Baccar. Inc. 583 F.Supp. 1577 (E.D.Mo.,, 1984) (lack of personal jurisdictions. 
In this matter, the facts set forth herein at Points I through IV clearly establish and 
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prove blatant, self-evident violations of Rule 11 which are easily capable of giving rise to 
the application of sanctions against both Plaintiff and his attorney. Steinle. Van Berkel 
supras. In cases imposing sanctions, both the Utah Court of Appeals and the Utah 
Supreme Court have noted that costs and attorneys fees are reasonable forms of sanctions 
where Rule 11 violations have been shown. Schoney v. Memorial Estates, Inc.. 863 P.2d 
59,62 (Ut.Ct.App, 1993); Barnard v. Sutliff. 846 P.2d 1229,1233-35 (Utah, 1992); Tavlor 
v. Estate of Tavlor. supra; Walker v. Carlson. 740 P.2d 1372 (Ut.Ct-App, 1987). Rule 11 
provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 
"...[I]f a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, 
the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the 
person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, 
which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount 
of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, 
motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee.1' 
See also 61A Am.jur.2d Pleading §§ 339 to 349; 71 C J.S. Pleading §§ 339 to 368; 46 
A.L.R.4th.249 (Liability of attorney, acting for client, for malicious prosecution); 77 
A.L.R.4th 789 (Inherent power of federal district court to impose monetary sanctions on 
counsel in absence of contempt of court).; 95 A.L.R. Fed. 107 (General principles 
regarding imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, F.R.C.P.); 95 A.L.R. Fed. 181 
(Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, F.R.C.P, pertaining to signing and verification of 
pleadings); 100 A.L.R. Fed. 556 (Procedural requirements for imposition of sanctions 
under Rule 11, F.R.C.P.); West's Key Numbers. - Pleading, key notes. 287 to 304; 
Recent 
Developments in Utah Law - Legislative Enactments - Attorney's Fees, Utah L. Rev. 342 
(1989); Note, Appellate Review of Rule 11 Issues - De Novo or Abuse of Discretion? 
Thomas v. Capital Security Services, Inc., B.Y.U. L. Rev. 877 (1989). 
Because of the blatant Rule 11 violations in this matter, appellant has necessarily 
had to expend time and monies in researching the issues set forth herein to determine the 
validity thereof and to prepare to defend against this moot action., the inherent bars 
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notwithstanding. Because of the similarity of the facts in this matter with the rationale of 
Taylor, supra, with regard to the issue of appropriate sanctions, it is instructive to note the 
opinion rendered by the Court of Appeals therein, where it was held as follows: 
"Imposition of $5,000 in attorney fees as a sanction for violating this rule 
was not an abuse of discretion, where the wrong document was attached to 
the complaint, causing defendants to incur legal expense in researching the 
validity of an irrelevant document and preparing a motion to dismiss based 
thereon." Ibid, 770 P.2d at 171. 
The facts of this matter conclusively appear to a certainty that the plaintiff would 
not be entitled to relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of its 
claim, Securities Credit Corp. v. Willev. 265 P.2d 422 (Utah 1953), and appellant has 
thus shown that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he is entitled to a 
judgment of dismissal as a matter of law. In re Williams' Estates, 348 P.2d 683 (Utah 
1960); Ruffineneo v. Miller. 579 P.2d 342 (Utah 1978); Bowen v. Riverton City. 656 
P.2d 434 (Utah 1982); Snvder v. Merkelev. 693 P.2d 64 (Utah 1984); Geneva Pipe Co. v. 
S&H Ins. Co.. 714 P.2d 648 (Utah 1986). 
CONCLUSION 
For causes and reasons set forth herein and in light of the foregoing points and 
authorities as construed in connection with the facts of this matter, appellant is entitled to, 
a judgment of dismissal of this matter and an award of appropriate sanctions, including 
reasonable attorney's fees, and costs, and it is hereby so moved. 
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DATED this /2-, day of May, 1999. 
Daniel A. Stapkm aKa~DTAron Stanton 
DeiendantTAppellant Pro Se 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the /'2-day of May, 1999, two (2) true and correct copies 
of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT D. ARON STANTON were hand delivered as 
follows: 
David C. Anderson 
505 East 200 South, Suite 400 
First Federal Plaza 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
-31-
